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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1  
Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly 
Yasui—the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon 
Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui—come forward as 
amici curiae because they see the disturbing 
relevance of this Court’s decisions in their fathers’ 
                                            
1 This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties.  No 
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no person or entity other than amici curiae made a monetary 





infamous cases challenging the mass removal and 
incarceration of Japanese Americans during World 
War II to the serious questions raised by Presidential 
Proclamation No. 9645.  
Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in 
Portland, Oregon, when, on March 28, 1942, he 
intentionally defied the government’s first actionable 
order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese 
ancestry in order to challenge the order’s 
constitutionality.  Gordon Hirabayashi was a 24-
year-old college senior in Seattle, Washington, when, 
on May 16, 1942, he similarly chose to defy the 
government’s curfew and removal orders.  Fred 
Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland, 
California, when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested 
for refusing to report for removal.   
All three men brought their constitutional 
challenges to this Court.  Deferring to the 
government’s claim that the orders were justified by 
military necessity, the Court affirmed their 
convictions.  Our Nation has since recognized that 
the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese 
Americans was wrong; the three cases have been 
widely condemned; and all three men have been 
recognized with the Presidential Medal of Freedom 
for their wartime courage and lifetime work 
advancing civil and human rights. 
Their children have sought to carry forward 
their fathers’ legacy by educating the public and, as 
appropriate, reminding the courts of the human toll 
and constitutional harms wrought by governmental 
actions, carried out in the name of national security, 
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that impact men, women, and children belonging to 
disfavored minority groups.  Guilt, loyalty, and threat 
are individual attributes.  Courts must be vigilant 
when these attributes are imputed to entire racial, 
religious, and/or ethnic groups.  The Hirabayashi, 
Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as important 
reminders of the need for courts—and especially this 
Court—to fulfill their essential role in our democracy 
by checking unfounded exercises of executive power.   
The Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui 
families are proud to stand with the following public 
interest organizations: 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is based at the Seattle 
University School of Law.  Inspired by the legacy of 
Fred Korematsu, the Korematsu Center works to 
advance justice for all through research, advocacy, 
and education.  The Korematsu Center has a special 
interest in addressing government action targeting 
classes of persons based on race, nationality, or 
religion and in seeking to ensure that courts 
understand the historical—and, at times, unjust—
underpinnings of arguments asserted to support the 
exercise of such executive power.  The Korematsu 
Center does not, here or otherwise, represent the 
official views of Seattle University. 
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing 
Justice”) is the national affiliation of five nonpartisan 
civil rights organizations whose offices are located in 
Washington D.C. (AAJC), San Francisco (Asian Law 
Caucus), Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles.  Through 
direct services, impact litigation, amicus briefs, policy 
advocacy, leadership development, and capacity 
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building, the Advancing Justice affiliates advocate for 
marginalized members of the Asian American, Native 
Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, and other underserved 
communities, including immigrant members of those 
communities. 
The Asian American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (“AALDEF”), founded in 1974, is a 
national organization that protects and promotes the 
civil rights of Asian Americans.  By combining 
litigation, advocacy, education, and organizing, 
AALDEF works with Asian American communities 
nationwide to secure human rights for all.  In 1982, 
AALDEF supported reparations for Japanese 
Americans forcibly relocated and imprisoned during 
World War II.  After 9/11, AALDEF represented more 
than 800 individuals from Muslim-majority countries 
who were called in to report to immigration 
authorities under the Special Registration program.  
AALDEF is currently providing community education 
and legal counseling to Asian Americans affected by 
the challenged Presidential Proclamation. 
The Hispanic National Bar Association 
(“HNBA”) comprises thousands of Latino lawyers, 
law professors, law students, legal professionals, 
state and federal judges, legislators, and bar 
affiliates across the country.  The HNBA is 
committed to advocacy on issues of importance, 
including immigration and protection of refugees, to 
the 53 million people of Hispanic heritage living in 
the United States.   
The Japanese American Citizens League of 
Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) draws 
upon Hawaii’s rich, multiethnic society and strong 
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cultural values, but broadly focuses on addressing 
discrimination and intolerance towards all people 
victimized by injustice and prejudice.  JACL 
Honolulu supported redress for Japanese Americans 
incarcerated during World War II and sponsors 
annual events to educate the public regarding that 
unjust incarceration, one of the core reasons for the 
founding of the JACL Honolulu chapter. 
LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is 
a national civil rights legal defense fund that has 
defended the constitutional rights and equal 
protection of all Latinos under the law.  
LatinoJustice’s continuing mission is to promote the 
civic participation of the greater pan-Latino 
community in the United States, to cultivate Latino 
community leaders, and to engage in and support law 
reform litigation across the country addressing 
criminal justice, education, employment, fair 
housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights, 
redistricting, and voting rights.  During its 45-year 
history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous cases 
in both state and federal courts challenging 
governmental racial discrimination.  
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the 
largest and oldest association of predominantly 
African-American attorneys and judges in the United 
States.  Founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000 
African-American attorneys nationwide and when 
other national bar associations, such as the ABA, did 
not admit African-American attorneys, the NBA 
today has a membership of approximately 66,000 
lawyers, judges, law professors and law students, and 
has over 75 affiliate chapters.  Throughout its 
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history, the NBA consistently has advocated on 
behalf of African Americans and other minority 
populations regarding issues affecting the legal 
profession. 
The South Asian Bar Association of North 
America (“SABA”) is the umbrella organization for 26 
regional bar associations in North America 
representing the interests of over 6,000 attorneys of 
South Asian descent.  Providing a vital link for the 
South Asian community to the law and legal system, 
SABA takes an active interest in the legal rights of 
South Asian and other minority communities. 
Members of SABA include immigration lawyers and 
others who represent persons that have been and will 




INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF 
ARGUMENT 
“Often the question has been raised whether this 
country could wage a new war without the loss of its 
fundamental liberties at home.  Here is one occasion 
for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that 
question and show the world that we can fight for 
democracy and preserve it too.” 
 
Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Court 
in 1943, as he appealed his conviction for violating 
military orders issued three months after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  Authorized by 
Executive Order No. 9066, those orders led to the 
forced removal and incarceration of over 120,000 
men, women, and children of Japanese descent living 
on the West Coast. 
Mr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before this 
Court.  Minoru Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s 
ideals in casting his separate but related appeal as 
“the case of all whose parents came to our shores for 
a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country 
should respond to war and strife “in the American 
way and not by *** acts of injustice.”  Appellant Br. 
55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30, 
1943).  The Court denied the appeals of both men.  
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); 
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).   
The following year, this Court revisited the mass 
removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans in 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  In 
Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as a 
bulwark against governmental action that 
8 
 
undermines core constitutional principles.  By 
refusing to scrutinize the government’s claim that its 
abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was 
justified by military necessity, the Court enabled the 
government to cover its racially discriminatory 
policies in the cloak of national security.    
In this case, the Court is once again asked to 
abdicate its critical role in safeguarding fundamental 
freedoms.  Invoking national security, the 
government seeks near complete deference to the 
President’s decision to deny indefinitely all 
immigrant and most non-immigrant visas to 
nationals of six Muslim-majority countries.  See 
Proclamation 9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities 
and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into 
the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-
Safety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) 
(“Presidential Proclamation”).  
The government claims it is merely asking for 
the application of established legal principles, but the 
extreme deference it seeks is not rooted in sound 
constitutional tradition.  Rather, it rests on doctrinal 
tenets infected with long-repudiated racial and 
nativist precepts.  In support of the sweeping 
proposition that the President’s authority to exclude 
aliens is unbounded, the government previously 
invoked the so-called “plenary power” doctrine—that 
doctrine derives from decisions such as Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), which 
relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to eschew 
judicial scrutiny in upholding a law that prohibited 
Chinese laborers from returning to the United States 
after travel abroad.  Id. at 595. 
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Although no longer using the term “plenary 
power,” the government continues to assert that “any 
policy toward aliens”—including a decision to exclude 
an entire class of individuals based on religion and 
national origin—is “so exclusively entrusted to the 
political branches of government as to be largely 
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”  Gov’t 
Br. 23 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 588-589 (1952)).  As the Ninth Circuit observed, 
the numbing judicial passivity the government 
demands “runs contrary to the fundamental 
structure of our constitutional democracy” in which 
“it is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a 
duty that will sometimes require the ‘[r]esolution of 
litigation challenging the constitutional authority of 
one of the three branches.’”  Washington v. Trump, 
847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
Even more than the early “plenary power” 
decisions, the shades of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and 
Yasui lurking in the government’s argument should 
give this Court pause.  In those cases, the 
government’s policies were ostensibly backed by the 
controversial “Final Report” issued by Lieutenant 
General John L. DeWitt, the military commander 
who ordered the mass removal and incarceration of 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast.  By the time 
it was finally presented to this Court, the Final 
Report—which history revealed to be riddled with 
falsehoods about the national security threat posed 
by Japanese Americans—had been materially altered 
to hide the racist motivations of its author.  
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Here, another report, this time from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, purports to justify 
the President’s decision to exclude classes of 
individuals based on nationality and religion—only 
this time, the government has resisted allowing even 
the courts to review the report.  See Letter to Patricia 
S. Connor, Clerk of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, from Sharon Swingle, 
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants, re: IRAP v. 
Trump, No. 17-2231 (Nov. 24, 2017) (“Fourth Circuit 
Letter”).  That fact alone should raise alarms. 
Regrettably, however, hidden and suspect 
government reports are far from the only similarity 
between this case and Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and 
Yasui.  As here, in those cases, the government 
denied that its policies were grounded in “invidious 
*** discrimination” and asked the Court to take it at 
its word that “the security of the nation” justified 
blanket action against an “entire group *** at once.”  
Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870 
(U.S. May 8, 1943).  In its now infamous decisions, 
this Court agreed. 
In Hirabayashi, the Court concluded that even 
though racial distinctions are “odious to a free 
people,” it could not “reject as unfounded the 
[government’s] judgment” that the measures taken 
against Japanese Americans were necessary.  
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99-100.  Going further in 
Korematsu, the Court denied that race played any 
role in the government’s decisions: “Cast[ing] this 
case into outlines of racial prejudice,” the Court 
opined, “without reference to the real military 
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the 
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issue.”  323 U.S. at 223.  Accepting the government’s 
assurance, the Court went on to find that “Korematsu 
was not excluded from the [West Coast] because of 
hostility to him or his race[,] [h]e was excluded 
because *** the properly constituted military 
authorities *** decided that the military urgency of 
the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese 
ancestry be segregated *** temporarily.”  Id.  
Not all members of the Court were convinced, 
however.  Three Justices dissented, including Justice 
Murphy, who declared that the exclusion of Japanese 
Americans “falls into the ugly abyss of racism,” 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and Justice Jackson, 
who pointed out that the Court “had no real evidence” 
to support the government’s assertions of military 
necessity.  Moreover, Justice Jackson warned, the 
Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the 
hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need.”  Id. at 246. 
As history has made us acutely aware, the 
dissenters’ doubts as to the veracity of the 
government’s assertion of military necessity were 
well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of 
the Court’s decision was prophetic.  Four decades 
after the Court upheld their convictions, Gordon 
Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu 
successfully sought to have them vacated in 
unprecedented coram nobis proceedings.  Evidence 
presented in those cases showed that the “military 
urgency” on which this Court predicated its decision 
(and the purported justification asserted in General 
DeWitt’s Final Report) was nothing more than a 
smokescreen:  The real reason for the government’s 
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deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not 
acts of espionage, but rather a baseless perception of 
disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.   
With the benefit of hindsight, Korematsu (and 
by inference Hirabayashi and Yasui) “stands as a 
constant caution that in times of war or declared 
military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in 
protecting constitutional guarantees” and “national 
security must not be used to protect governmental 
actions from close scrutiny and accountability.”  
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 
(N.D. Cal. 1984).  Put simply, those cases “illustrate[] 
that it can be highly destructive of civil liberties to 
understand the Constitution as giving the President 
a blank check.”  STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND 
THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 84 (2015).   
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as 
wrong today as they were on the day they were 
decided.  If it were to accept the government’s 
invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility, 
the Court would repeat its failures in those widely 
condemned cases.  The Court should instead take this 
opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate 
its refusal to scrutinize the government’s claim of 
necessity and its consequent failure to recognize the 
military orders’ racist underpinnings.  Heeding the 
lessons of history, the Court should subject the 
President’s decision to meaningful judicial scrutiny 
and affirm the Founders’ visionary principle that an 
independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational 




I. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF 
PLENARY POWER DERIVES FROM 
CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND 
XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES. 
In defending the first Executive Order that 
sought to exclude aliens from Muslim-majority 
countries, the government argued that “political 
branches[] [have] plenary constitutional authority 
over foreign affairs, national security, and 
immigration.”  Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16, 
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 
2017).  In light of that “plenary authority,” the 
government asserted, “[j]udicial second-guessing of 
the President’s determination that a temporary 
suspension of entry of certain classes of aliens was 
necessary *** to protect national security *** 
constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.”  Id. at 15.   
Despite shedding the “plenary power” label, the 
government’s central argument remains unchanged:  
The political branches’ “power to *** exclude aliens” 
is “largely immune from judicial control.” Gov’t Br. 18 
(ellipsis in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 792 (1977)).  This Court, however, has never 
recognized an unbridled “plenary” power in the 
immigration realm that would preclude judicial 
review.  And to the extent that it has shown excessive 
deference to the political branches in some cases, 
those precedents are linked to racist attitudes from a 
past era that have long since fallen out of favor.  
1.   In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known 
as The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a 
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statute barring the return of Chinese laborers who 
had departed the United States prior to its passage.  
130 U.S. at 581-582.  Describing the reasons 
underlying the law’s enactment, the Court 
characterized Chinese laborers as “content with the 
simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our 
laborers and artisans,” and observed that they 
remained “strangers in the land, residing apart by 
themselves, *** adhering to the customs and usages 
of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with 
our people.”  Id. at 595.  “The differences of race 
added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.”  Id.  
Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained, 
warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or 
believed they saw *** great danger that at no distant 
day *** [the West] would be overrun by them, unless 
prompt action was taken to restrict their 
immigration.”  Id.   
Far from applying a skeptical eye to the law in 
light of the clear animus motivating its passage, the 
Court found that “[i]f *** the government of the 
United States, through its legislative department, 
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race 
in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be 
dangerous to its peace and security *** its 
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”  The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606; see also 
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the 
Chinese Exclusion Cases:  The “Plenary Power” 
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 
10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003).  In reality, the “right of 
self-preservation” that the Court validated as 
justification for the government’s unbounded power 
to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial self-
15 
 
preservation, not the preservation of borders or 
national security.  130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 606 (“It 
matters not in what form *** aggression and 
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation 
acting in its national character, or from vast hordes 
of its people crowding in upon us.”). 
Similar racist and xenophobic attitudes are 
evident in decisions following The Chinese Exclusion 
Case.  See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement that 
Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible 
white witness” in order to remain in the country); id. 
at 730 (noting Congress’s belief that testimony from 
Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of 
“the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the 
obligation of an oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).  
2. Even in its early plenary power decisions, 
however, the Court recognized that the government’s 
sovereign authority is subject to constitutional 
limitations.  See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 
U.S. at 604 (“[S]overeign powers *** [are] restricted 
in their exercise only by the constitution itself and 
considerations of public policy and justice which 
control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized 
nations.”).  Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the 
Court divided over the reach of the government’s 
power in light of those limitations.   
Fong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring 
Chinese laborers residing in the United States to 
obtain a special certificate of residence to avoid 
deportation, generated three dissenting opinions.  See 
149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that 
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there is any arbitrary and unrestrained power to 
banish residents, even resident aliens.”); id. at 744 
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J., 
dissenting).  Even Justice Field, who authored the 
Court’s opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case, 
sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s 
application with regard to alien residents:  
As men having our common humanity, they 
are protected by all the guaranties of the 
constitution. To hold that they are subject 
to any different law, or are less protected in 
any particular, than other persons, is *** to 
ignore the teachings of our history *** and 
the language of our constitution. 
Id. at 754. 
Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism 
regarding an unrestrained plenary power persisted—
and proliferated.  In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu (see 
note 2, infra), upheld a provision permitting the 
deportation of resident aliens who were members of 
the Communist Party.  In dissent, Justice Douglas 
quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting, 
observing that they “grow[] in power with the passing 
years”: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in 
sovereignty is one both indefinite and 
dangerous. *** The governments of other 
nations have elastic powers.  Ours are fixed 
and bounded by a written constitution.  The 
expulsion of a race may be within the 
inherent powers of a despotism.  History, 
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before the adoption of this constitution, was 
not destitute of examples of the exercise of 
such a power; and its framers were familiar 
with history, and wisely, as it seems to me, 
they gave to this government no general 
power to banish. 
Id. at 599-600.   
In another McCarthy-era precedent, four 
Justices advocated for limitations on the plenary 
power doctrine.  In Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Court rejected 
any constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an 
alien who had previously resided in the United 
States, despite his resulting indefinite detention at 
Ellis Island.  In dissent, Justice Black, joined by 
Justice Douglas, reasoned that “[n]o society is free 
where government makes one person’s liberty depend 
upon the arbitrary will of another.”  Id. at 217.  
“Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since 
time immemorial.  They do now.”  Id.  Justice 
Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added that 
such aliens must be “accorded procedural due process 
of law.”  Id. at 224. 
3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the 
xenophobic and race-based characterizations 
prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, the 
Court in recent years has been more willing to 
enforce constitutional limitations on the 
government’s authority over immigration matters.   
In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for 
example, the Court held that INS regulations must at 
least “rationally advanc[e] some legitimate 
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governmental purpose.”  Id. at 306.  In Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), the Court affirmed 
that a resident alien returning from a brief trip 
abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion 
proceeding.  Id. at 33.  And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
U.S. 678 (2001), in response to the government’s 
contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to 
create immigration law, and *** the Judicial Branch 
must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch 
decisionmaking in that area,” the Court observed 
that such “power is subject to important 
constitutional limitations.”  Id. at 695 (citations 
omitted).  “[F]ocus[ing] upon those limitations,” id., 
the Court determined that the indefinite detention of 
aliens deemed removable would raise “serious 
constitutional concerns” and accordingly construed 
the statute at issue to avoid those problems, id. at 
682.  See generally Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162-
1163 (collecting cases demonstrating reviewability of 
federal government action in immigration and 
national security matters).  
The Court’s most recent decision in this area 
provides further support for the conclusion that, after 
more than a century of erosion, the notion of plenary 
power over immigration is little more than a relic.   
In Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), this 
Court considered a due process claim arising from the 
denial without adequate explanation of a spouse’s 
visa application.  Although it described the power of 
the political branches over immigration as “plenary,” 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Din made 
clear that courts may review an exercise of that 
power.  Id. at 2139-2140.  Justice Kennedy 
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acknowledged that the Court in Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined to balance 
the constitutional rights of American citizens injured 
by a visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to 
make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude 
those who possess those characteristics which 
Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 
(quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766).  But he explained 
that the Court did inquire “whether the Government 
had provided a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ 
reason for its action.”  Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 
408 U.S. at 770).  And while as a general matter 
courts are not to “look behind” the government’s 
asserted reason, courts should do so if the challenger 
has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.”  Id. 
at 2141.   
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din 
acknowledged that the political branches are entitled 
to wide latitude and deference in immigration 
matters.  For that reason, the government relies 
heavily on Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion 
of a national security rationale is sufficient to justify 
the Presidential Proclamation and to preclude 
further judicial scrutiny.  See Gov’t Br. at 58-64.  But, 
as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, Din (and Mandel 
before it) concerned an individual visa denial on the 
facts of that case.  Washington, 847 F.3d at 1163-
1164.  By contrast, the Proclamation sets a 
nationwide immigration policy of denying all 
immigrant and most non-immigrant visas to aliens of 
certain nationalities.  While it may be sensible for 
courts ordinarily to defer to the judgment of the 
political branches when considering the application of 
immigration law to a particular alien, the President’s 
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decision to issue a broadly applicable immigration 
policy—especially one aimed at nationals of 
particular countries likely to share a common 
religion—is properly the subject of more searching 
judicial review.  See id.  
All told, modern judicial precedent supports the 
notion that courts have both the power and the 
responsibility to review Presidential Proclamation 
9645.  Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a 
far-reaching program—promulgated at the highest 
level of the Executive Branch and targeting aliens 
based on nationality and religion—precedent and 
common sense demand more than an assessment of 
whether the government has offered a “facially 
legitimate and bona fide” rationale for its policy.  
Rather, this policy, both on its face and in light of the 
glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for 
careful judicial scrutiny.  
II. KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI 
STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE 
NEED FOR SEARCHING JUDICIAL 
REVIEW WHEN THE GOVERNMENT 
TARGETS DISFAVORED MINORITIES IN 
THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY. 
This Court need not look far for a reminder of 
the constitutional costs and human suffering that 
flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein in sweeping 
governmental action against disfavored minorities.  
And it need not look far for a reminder of the 
Executive Branch’s use of national security as a 
pretext to discriminate against such groups.  The 
Court need look only to its own precedents—its all 
21 
 
but universally condemned wartime decisions in 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.   
1.   On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the 
Secretary of War to designate “military areas” from 
which “any or all persons” could be excluded and 
“with respect to which, the right of any person to 
enter, remain in, or leave” would be subject to 
“whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the 
appropriate Military Commander may impose.”  
Exec. Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of 
War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).  Adding its imprimatur to the 
Executive Order, Congress made violation of any 
restrictions issued thereunder a federal offense.  An 
Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 
173. 
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the 
Western Defense Command, used that authority to 
issue a series of proclamations that led to the 
removal and incarceration of all individuals of 
Japanese ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an 
exclusion area covering the entire Pacific Coast.  
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89.  A curfew order came 
first.  Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered 
to abandon their homes and communities on the 
West Coast for tarpaper barracks (euphemistically 
called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed 
wire and machine gun towers in desolate areas 
inland.  Id. at 90. 
For different individual reasons, but sharing a 
deep sense of justice, Minoru Yasui, Gordon 
Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to comply 
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with General DeWitt’s orders.  Yasui, a young 
lawyer, regarded the curfew as an affront to 
American constitutional values.  “To make it a crime 
for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese 
person *** solely on the basis of ancestry,” he 
explained, “was, in my opinion, an absolutely 
abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.” 
Testimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, 
Japanese Am. Citizens League 9, Comm’n on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
(1981).  “Our law and our basic concept of justice had 
always been founded upon the fundamental principle 
that no person should be punished but for that 
individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.”  
Id. at 10.  Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui 
immediately defied it in order to initiate a 
constitutional challenge. 
 Hirabayashi, a student at the University of 
Washington, also defied the orders so that he could 
challenge their constitutionality, saying that he 
“considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic 
standards for which this nation lives.”  PETER IRONS, 
JUSTICE AT WAR:  THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 88 (1984).   
Korematsu, a welder living in Oakland, CA, 
refused to obey the removal orders so that he could 
remain with his fiancée who was not subject to 
removal because she was not Japanese American.  
The last of the three to face arrest and prosecution, 
Korematsu “shared with Yasui and Hirabayashi an 
equal devotion to constitutional principle” and 
believed that the statute under which he was 
convicted was wrong.  Id. at 98. 
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2. The constitutional challenges Yasui, 
Hirabayashi, and Korematsu made to the military 
orders soon made their way to this Court.  But far 
from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional 
structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the 
protection of fundamental rights, the Court set upon 
a path of judicial abdication that today serves as a 
cautionary tale.   
In Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to 
consider only his conviction for violating the curfew 
order, leaving unanswered his challenge to his 
conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control 
Station—a precursor to removal from his home in 
Seattle.  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85.  Harkening 
back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court 
repeated the government’s claim that “social, 
economic and political conditions” “intensified the[] 
solidarity” of Japanese Americans and “prevented 
their assimilation as an integral part of the white 
population.”  Id. at 96.  Betraying no skepticism of 
these premises, the Court found that, in view of these 
and other attributes of the “isolation” of Japanese 
Americans and their “relatively little social 
intercourse *** [with] the white population,” 
“Congress and the Executive could reasonably have 
concluded that these conditions *** encouraged the 
continued attachment of members of this group to 
Japan and Japanese institutions.”  Id. at 98.  
“Whatever views we may entertain regarding the 
loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese 
ancestry,” the Court continued, “we cannot reject as 
unfounded the judgment of the military authorities 
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of 
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that population, whose number and strength could 
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”  Id. at 99.   
Having upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the 
Court issued only a short opinion remanding Yasui’s 
case to the Ninth Circuit.  Yasui, 320 U.S. at 115.  
Because the district court had imposed a sentence 
based on its determination that Yasui had renounced 
his American citizenship, and the government did not 
defend that finding, the Court remanded the matter 
for resentencing.  Id. at 117.  The Court thereby 
avoided addressing the district court’s conclusion, 
supported by extensive analysis, that the military 
orders were unconstitutional as applied to citizens.  
See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54 (D. 
Or. 1942). 
The Court’s third opportunity to confront the 
mass removal and incarceration program came a 
year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s case.  The 
Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting 
Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could 
not be extricated from the incarceration he would 
inevitably face if he complied with that order.  323 
U.S. at 216.  Then, despite affirming that racial 
distinctions are “immediately suspect” and “must [be] 
subject *** to the most rigid scrutiny,” id., the Court 
denied, without probing examination, that the 
military orders were driven by racial hostility.  The 
Court reiterated its conclusion from Hirabayashi that 
it would not substitute its judgment for that of the 
military authorities.  “There was evidence of 
disloyalty on the part of some,” the Court reasoned, 
and “the military authorities considered that the 
need for action was great, and time was short.  We 
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cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective 
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions 
were unjustified.”  Id. at 223-224. 
When the Court decided Korematsu, however, 
three members rejected the government’s arguments.  
In vigorous dissents, Justices Murphy and Jackson 
sharply questioned the validity of the military 
justification the government advanced.  Although 
acknowledging that the discretion of those entrusted 
with national security matters “must, as a matter of 
*** common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared 
that “it is essential that there be definite limits to 
military discretion” and that individuals not be “left 
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea 
of military necessity that has neither substance nor 
support.”  323 U.S. at 234.  In his view, the exclusion 
order “clearly d[id] not meet th[is] test” as it relied 
“for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all 
persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous 
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.”  Id. at 
234-235 (emphasis added).  In fact, as Justice 
Murphy noted, intelligence investigations found no 
evidence of Japanese American sabotage or 
espionage.  Id. at 241.  And even if “there were some 
disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific 
Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that 
examples of individual disloyalty prove group 
disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against 
the entire group” is nothing more than “th[e] 
legalization of racism.”  Id. at 240-241, 242.   
Justice Jackson was equally dubious of the 
factual basis for the government’s claim that the 
military orders were justified.  The government never 
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submitted General DeWitt’s Final Report to the lower 
courts.  Although the report was eventually 
presented to this Court, by then it was too late for 
development of record evidence to challenge the 
report or counter its assertions.  Those facts were not 
lost on Justice Jackson, who viewed the report with 
skepticism.  “How does the Court know,” he asked, 
“that these orders have a reasonable basis in 
necessity?”  323 U.S. at 245.  Pointing out that “[n]o 
evidence whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken 
by this or any other court” and that the Final Report 
was the subject of “sharp controversy as to [its] 
credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court 
had “no real evidence before it” and thus “ha[d] no 
choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, 
self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination, that what he did was reasonable.”  Id.   
Justice Jackson saw grave dangers in the 
Court’s opinion.  While an unconstitutional military 
order is short-lived, he observed, “once a judicial 
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it 
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes 
the Constitution to show that the Constitution 
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has 
validated the principle of racial discrimination in 
criminal procedure and of transplanting American 
citizens.”  323 U.S. at 246.  With that, Justice 
Jackson issued a prophetic warning:  By “validat[ing] 
the principle of racial discrimination in criminal 
procedure and of transplanting American citizens,” 
the Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the 
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hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need.”  Id.2 
3.  The dissenters’ fears proved to be well-
founded.  Decades after this Court’s decisions in 
Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, newly 
discovered government records revealed not only that 
intelligence reports and data contradicted the claim 
that the mass removal and incarceration program 
was justified by military necessity, but also that the 
government knew as much when it convinced the 
Court to affirm the defendants’ convictions.3 
In 1983, armed with those newly discovered 
records, Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed 
                                            
2   Justice Jackson’s usage of Korematsu and Hirabayashi as 
precedent in Harisiades (see p. 16, supra), on which the 
government relies (Gov’t Br. 18), brought this warning to life.  
In Harisiades, a noncitizen claimed that due process protected 
his liberties in the same way it does the rights of citizens.   But 
Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Justice Jackson wrote, show that 
even citizens are unprotected from far-reaching government 
claims of national security.  Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591 & n.17 
(“When citizens raised the Constitution as a shield against 
expulsion from their homes and places of business, the Court 
refused to find hardship a cause for judicial intervention.”).  
Constrained by stare decisis, Justice Jackson applied Korematsu 
as standing precedent to reject Harisiades’ constitutional claim.  
That application to the specific facts in Harisiades extended 
Korematsu’s principle of extreme deference to “new purposes”—
precisely the danger Justice Jackson predicted in his “loaded 
weapon” warning.  323 U.S. at 246. 
3 Those records are discussed at length in Justice at War:  The 
Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter 




coram nobis petitions seeking to vacate their 
convictions.  As the court found in the Hirabayashi 
case, government records showed that General 
DeWitt’s Final Report had been materially altered in 
order to fabricate an acceptable factual justification 
for the mass removal and incarceration program.  
Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 
1456-1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986).  Although the version 
of the report presented to this Court stated that it 
was impossible to identify potentially disloyal 
Japanese Americans in the time available, a prior 
printed version—submitted to the War Department 
while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and 
Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the 
decision to issue the challenged orders had nothing to 
do with urgency.  Rather, General Dewitt’s decision 
turned on his view that Japanese Americans were 
inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race, 
intense feeling of filial piety and *** strong bonds of 
common tradition, culture and customs.”  Id. at 1449.  
“It was not that there was insufficient time in which 
to make such a determination” the original report 
stated; “a positive determination could not be made 
[because] an exact separation of the ‘sheep and the 
goats’ was unfeasible.”  Id. (quoting Lieutenant 
General John L. DeWitt, Final Report:  Japanese 
Evacuation from the West Coast ch. 2 (1942)). 
Beyond exposing the racist underpinnings of 
General DeWitt’s orders (as well as the pretextual 
nature of the claim of urgency), the coram nobis cases 
revealed that the government possessed information 
rebutting the assertion in the DeWitt Report that 
Japanese Americans were involved in sabotage and 
espionage.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 
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591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987).  The Office of Naval 
Intelligence (“ONI”), which the President charged 
with monitoring West Coast Japanese American 
communities, had determined in its official report 
that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal 
and posed no security risk.  ONI thus recommended 
handling any potential disloyalty on an individual, 
not group, basis. ONI found, contrary to the 
government’s representation to this Court, that mass 
incarceration was unnecessary, as “individual 
determinations could be made expeditiously.”  Id. at 
602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also IRONS, supra, at 
203.  In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) directly refuted claims in the 
DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were 
engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating 
Japanese American espionage.  Korematsu, 584 F. 
Supp. at 1417.  Indeed, FBI Director Hoover wrote to 
Attorney General Biddle shortly before President 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 that the push 
for mass racial handling was based on politics rather 
than facts.  Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir. 
FBI to Francis Biddle, Att’y Gen. (Feb. 2, 1942). 
Department of Justice attorney John Burling, 
co-author of the government’s brief, sought to alert 
the Court of the FBI and FCC intelligence that 
directly refuted the DeWitt Report.  Burling included 
in his brief a crucial footnote that read:  “The recital 
[in General DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances 
justifying the evacuation as a matter of military 
necessity *** is in several respects, particularly with 
reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and 
to shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese 
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ancestry, in conflict with information in the 
possession of the Department of Justice.”  Korematsu, 
584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted).  
But high-level Justice Department lawyers stopped 
the brief’s printing.  Despite Burling’s vociferous 
protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional 
falsehoods,” id. at 1418, the footnote was diluted to 
near incoherence, even implying the opposite of 
Burling’s intended message.  As revised, the footnote 
stated: 
[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this 
brief for statistics and other details 
concerning the actual evacuation and the 
events that took place subsequent thereto.  
We have specifically recited in this brief the 
facts relating to the justification for the 
evacuation, of which we ask the Court to 
take judicial notice, and we rely upon the 
Final Report only to the extent that it 
relates to such facts. 
Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1944).  Notwithstanding an earlier 
warning from Justice Department lawyer Edward 
Ennis that failing to alert the Court to the contrary 
intelligence in DOJ’s possession “might approximate 
the suppression of evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 
at 602 n.11 (citation omitted), the Justice 
Department concealed from the Court this material 
evidence on military necessity.  
In light of the evidence presented, the courts 
hearing Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi’s 
coram nobis cases concluded that the government’s 
misconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and 
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that the mass removal and incarceration program 
had been validated based on unfounded charges of 
treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417; 
Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447. 4   In granting 
Korematsu’s coram nobis petition, Judge Patel 
articulated the modern significance of the wartime 
cases:  
Korematsu *** stands as a constant caution 
that in times of war or declared military 
necessity our institutions must be vigilant 
in protecting constitutional guarantees.  It 
stands as a caution that in times of distress 
the shield of military necessity and 
national security must not be used to 
protect governmental actions from close 
scrutiny and accountability.  It stands as a 
caution that in times of international 
hostility and antagonisms our institutions, 
legislative, executive and judicial, must be 
prepared to exercise their authority to 
protect all citizens from the petty fears and 
prejudices that are so easily aroused. 
Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.  
In vacating Korematsu, Yasui, and 
Hirabayashi’s convictions, the coram nobis courts 
joined other governmental institutions in recognizing 
                                            
4 In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the 
government’s request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his 
petition for relief without making any determinations regarding 
government misconduct—and without acknowledging the 
injustice he suffered.   
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the wrongs committed against Japanese Americans 
during World War II.  In 1976, President Ford 
officially rescinded Executive Order 9066, explaining 
that “[w]e now know what we should have known 
then—not only was *** evacuation wrong, but 
Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.”  
Presidential Proclamation 4417, “An American 
Promise,” 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976).  The 
Executive Branch also recognized the contributions of 
the three men who challenged the military orders.  
Each one received the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor:  Fred 
Korematsu in 1998, Gordon Hirabayashi in 2012, and 
Minoru Yasui in 2015. 
In 1983, after extensive hearings and research, 
the congressionally authorized Commission on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
(CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not 
“military necessity” that underpinned the mass 
removal and incarceration program, but rather “race 
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political 
leadership.”  REPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE 
DENIED 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education 
Fund & University of Washington Press, 1997).  Five 
years later, Congress passed (and President Reagan 
signed) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the 
CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the 
injustice of the removal and incarceration program, 
issued an official apology, and conferred symbolic 
reparations to the survivors of the incarceration 
centers.   
Most recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor 
General confirmed what the coram nobis cases had 
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established decades earlier:  This Court’s wartime 
decisions were predicated on lies.  “By the time the 
cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu 
reached the Supreme Court, [DOJ] had learned of a 
key intelligence report that undermined the rationale 
behind the internment. *** But the Solicitor General 
did not inform the Court of the report despite 
warnings *** that failing to alert the Court ‘might 
approximate the suppression of evidence.’  Instead, 
he argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal 
Japanese Americans from disloyal ones.”  U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Confession of Error:  The Solicitor 
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American 




III. THE GOVERNMENT’S LITIGATION 
STRATEGY IN THIS CASE DEMANDS 
THIS COURT’S VIGILANCE. 
The government’s arguments in this case bear a 
disturbing similarity to the arguments this Court 
accepted in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.  
Defending the military orders in Hirabayashi, the 
government told this Court: 
The classification was not based upon 
invidious race discrimination.  Rather, it 
was founded upon the fact that the group 
as a whole contained an unknown 
number of persons who could not readily 
be singled out and who were a threat to 
the security of the nation; and in order to 
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impose effective restraints upon them it 
was necessary not only to deal with the 
entire group, but to deal with it at once.  
Certainly, it cannot be said that such a 
conclusion was beyond the honest 
judgment, reasonably exercised, of those 
whose duty it was to protect the Pacific 
Coast against attack. 
Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, supra 
(emphasis added). 
Here, the government similarly implores the 
Court to accept the rationale offered and not to look 
behind the four corners of the Presidential 
Proclamation to ascertain whether the policy is 
motivated by discriminatory animus.  “The 
Proclamation,” the government argues, “is explicitly 
premised on facially legitimate purposes: protecting 
national security and the national interest by 
preventing entry of persons about whom the United 
States lacks sufficient information to assess the risk 
they pose[.] *** The Proclamation thus amply 
establishes a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason’ for its restrictions.’”  Gov’t Br. 60 (quoting 
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).   
Decades after Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and 
Yasui, however, the national security justification 
the government offered for its wartime policies was 
proven false and the real reasons for the military 
orders—baseless concerns about disloyalty grounded 
in racial stereotypes—were exposed.  The 
government has offered no basis to believe that 
similar revelations about the President’s decision to 
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exclude individuals from Muslim-majority countries 
will not one day come to light.  To the contrary, the 
government’s representations and litigation strategy 
in this case only exacerbate that grave concern. 
First, although the government claims that it 
conducted a “worldwide review” to arrive at the 
decision to deny all immigrant and most non-
immigrant visas to designated classes, the 
Proclamation’s text offers reason to doubt that the 
review actually supports the policy.  The 
Proclamation indicates that its non-immigrant visa 
restrictions are “in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security” based on the worldwide review.  
Presidential Proclamation, § 1(h)(iii).  Notably, the 
Proclamation does not make the same claim with 
respect to the immigrant visa restrictions.  See id. at 
§ 1(h)(ii).  The government’s references to the 
worldwide review in its brief are similarly delicate.  
See Gov’t Br. 9-10. 
Second, despite the purported centrality of the 
worldwide review and corresponding report by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the government has 
gone to great lengths to shield that report from view.  
The government has resisted providing the report to 
the courts even for in camera inspection and has 
urged the courts not to “consider [its] contents” 
should they decide, over the government’s objections, 
to review the report.  See Notice of In Camera Ex 
Parte Lodging of Report Containing Classified 
Information and Objection to Review or 
Consideration of Report at 4, State of Hawaii v. 
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Trump et al., No. 17-cv-0050-DKW-KSC, ECF No. 
376 (D. Haw. Oct. 13, 2017); Fourth Circuit Letter, 
supra.  The government has also aggressively fought 
efforts to release the report publicly, arguing that it 
is protected from disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) by the presidential 
communications privilege.  See, e.g., Brennan Center 
for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 2, 2017).5 
Third, echoing the findings in the ONI, FBI and 
FCC reports suppressed in the wartime cases, the 
limited documents that have come to light pertaining 
to the President’s exclusion decision undermine 
rather than affirm the purported national security 
justification for the ban.  Following the first 
Executive Order suspending the entry of aliens from 
Muslim-majority nations, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) drafted a report 
assessing the likelihood that visitors and immigrants 
from those countries would commit acts of terrorism 
in the United States.  The report concluded that 
“citizens of countries affected by E.O. 13769 [were] 
                                            
5  In FOIA litigation, the government has released indexes 
describing the contents of the pages it continues to withhold.  
Those indexes indicate that the appendices for the reports on 
the “worldwide” review are only a few pages long.  See Letter to 
Judge Paul Gardephe from AUSA Christopher Connolly, 
Brennan Center for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018), ECF No. 31.  Because the reports’ 
appendices supposedly provide detail as to why the targeted 
countries’ vetting systems are inadequate, the paltry page count 
offers additional reason for skepticism that the reports provide a 
sufficient justification for the President’s policy.   
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rarely implicated in US-based terrorism” and “few of 
the impacted countries have terrorist groups that 
threaten the West.”  Acting Secretary for Intelligence 
and Analysis, DHS, Citizenship Likely an Unreliable 
Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States 
(Feb. 2017) (capitalization removed), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730
/DHS-intelligence-document-on-President-
Donald.pdf.  In other words, little more than six 
months before the Secretary of Homeland Security 
produced a report that purports to justify the visa-
denial policy, the Department concluded that the 
very individuals affected were unlikely to pose a 
threat to the United States if permitted to enter. 
Parallels to the government’s actions in the 
wartime cases have not been lost on the lower courts.  
Before enjoining the President’s Proclamation, the 
District Court of Maryland asked the government: 
“How is this different than Korematsu where [the 
United States] relied on an executive order by the 
President and many years after the fact it was 
determined that there was information within the 
Justice Department that contradicted 
representations made to the Court”?  Prelim. Inj. 
Hr’g Tr. at 50, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, et al. 
v. Trump, et al., No. 17-cv-00361-TDC (D. Md. Oct. 
16, 2017), ECF No. 217.  Even when confronted with 
that direct question, the government refused to 
assure the court that the DHS report entirely 
supports the policies contained in the Proclamation. 
See id. at 51 (“Your Honor, I’m not going to speak to 
the contents of the report.”).  Indeed, the government 
disclaimed any obligation to tell the court whether 
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advisors to the President disagreed that his 
exclusion decision was necessary.  See id. at 52 (“I do 
not think we either have the obligation or should be 
asked about whether there were disagreements 
among presidential advisors in the report and 
whether—what one describes as an inconsistency of 
what one agency thought or what another agency 
thought.”).   
The government’s refusal to produce the report 
underlying the Proclamation, or even to assure the 
courts that its contents do not undermine the 
President’s policy, offers ample reason for skepticism 
that the decision to exclude certain classes was based 
on a credible assessment of the national security 
threat those individuals pose.  The dubious nature of 
the government’s asserted justification raises the 
question whether, like in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, 
and Yasui, the decision was motivated by more 
nefarious considerations.   
* * * 
During World War II, this Court’s refusal to 
probe the government’s claim that military necessity 
justified the mass removal and incarceration of 
Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit in 
the government’s deception.  The Court’s blank-check 
treatment of the Executive Branch’s wartime 
policies—underscored by its repeated refusal to 
confront the most grievous aspects of those policies or 
to acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed 
the wrongs inflicted on Japanese Americans to 
continue unabated for years, and allowed the 
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government to avoid accountability for its egregious 
misconduct for decades.   
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are 
powerful reminders not only of the need for constant 
vigilance in protecting our fundamental values, but 
also of the essential role of the courts as a check on 
abuses of government power, especially during times 
of national and international stress. Rather than 
repeat the failures of the past, this Court should 
repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those 
cases:  Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even 
in areas in which decision-makers must wield wide 
discretion, is incompatible with the protection of 
fundamental freedoms.  Meaningful judicial review is 
an essential element of a healthy democracy.   
Consistent with those principles, this Court 
should reject the government’s invitation to abdicate 
its critical role in our constitutional system, subject 
the President’s exclusion decision to searching 
judicial scrutiny, and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi, 
Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu did—as a 
bulwark against governmental action that 





For the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
affirm the decisions below.  
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